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Abstract
Background: Compared with the fixed-price mechanism, the bookbuilding
mechanism has not changed the Chinese IPO high underpricing. How to develop
scientific and reasonable IPO pricing, and reduce the high IPO underpricing has
become a major challenge for China's securities market.
Methods: In this paper, using behavioral finance theory and game theory, we build the
Initial public offering (IPO) pricing and underpricing models with investors’ heterogeneity
based on different issuing mechanisms and provide a comparative analysis.
Results: Firstly, our models show that IPO underpricing will not be eliminated by
using either fixed-price or bookbuilding mechanisms, but when the investors’
heterogeneity expectation is the same, lower IPO underpricing can be obtained by
the issuing of bookbuilding compared with that of fixed price. Secondly, the IPO
underpricing may be larger than that under fixed price if the heterogeneity of
investors under bookbuilding is larger than that under fixed price. Thirdly, the
numerical analysis results provide strong support for our model.
Conclusions: These findings further explains the cause of the high IPO underpricing
long-standing in China.
Keywords: Stock issuing mechanisms; Heterogeneous expectations; Underpricing;
Bookbuilding; IPO
Introduction
Since China’s initial public offerings (IPOs) started adopting an accumulated bidding inquiry
system in 2005, the average underpricing of an IPO on its first day is still above 120 % and
market-oriented reform of stock issuing through bookbuilding has failed to fundamentally
eliminate the IPO high underpricing phenomenon. What is the primary cause for the high
underpricing of a national IPO? Why does market-oriented pricing fail to eliminate the IPO
high underpricing phenomenon? Many studies have researched China’s special market en-
vironment and system background, and have put forth many theoretical explanations and
conjectures. However, the existing empirical research literature can only obtain relevant
factors influencing IPO underpricing, but fails to theoretically explain why the IPO high
underpricing phenomenon still exists under national market-oriented pricing mechanisms.
Miller (1977), Ritter (1991), and other scholars think that investor mania for secondary
markets leads to IPO short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance, and indi-
cate that high underpricing may also derive from such investor mania. A small number of
scholars, such as Ljungqvist et al. (2004), have established a relation model between
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investor mania and IPO short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance, and
have formalized this theory. Gouldey (2006), Beneda and Zhang (2009), and Xiaocheng et
al. (2008, 2011) further developed an IPO pricing model based on this and explained the
reason for IPO high underpricing from the perspective of non-homogenous expectations of
investors, but they still fail to research the theoretical influence of investor behavior on IPO
underpricing under different issuing mechanisms. Chinese scholars Xiaohua et al. (2006)
empirically researched national IPO pricing efficiency in different periods and concluded
that national issuings through bookbuilding offers higher pricing efficiency than that of fixed
price. Liao (2010) took constituent stock from the SSE 50 index as a study sample and dis-
cussed the pricing efficiency of stock from the perspective of the specific information con-
tent in individual stocks. Huang Ge and Lin (2011) started with the relation between
behavior patterns of institutional investors and the pricing efficiency of the capital market,
and used shareholding data of securities investment funds to empirically study the influence
of funds shareholding behavior and shareholding changes on the pricing efficiency of the
capital market. Domestic scholars have tried to discover the reason for the effects on na-
tional IPO efficiency from an empirical perspective, but have still failed to explain why
market-oriented pricing cannot eliminate the IPO high underpricing phenomenon in China.
Literature that conducts theoretical research on IPO pricing efficiency under different pri-
cing mechanisms from the perspective of non-homogenous expectations of investors, to
our knowledge, does not exist.
Used the theory of behavioral finance and game theory, we build Initial public offer-
ing (IPO) pricing and underpricing models with investors’ heterogeneity based on dif-
ferent issuing mechanisms. We analysis how the heterogeneous expectations of
investors influence IPO underpricing under different issuing mechanisms and a com-
parative analysis of the different issuing mechanisms is conducted.we find that IPO
underpricing will not be eliminated by using either fixed-price or bookbuilding mecha-
nisms, but when the investors’ heterogeneity expectation is the same, lower IPO under-
pricing can be obtained by the issuing of bookbuilding compared with that of fixed
price. we also find the IPO underpricing may be larger than that under fixed price if
the heterogeneity of investors under bookbuilding is larger than that under fixed price.
In addition, numerical analysis results provide strong support for our model and ex-
plain why high IPO underpricing under bookbuilding exists in China.
This paper is divided into five sections. In section 2, we construct IPO pricing and
underpricing models. Section 3, we provide a theory analysis. Section 4, we do numer-
ical analysis. Section 5 is the results and discussion. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Although the above mentioned literatures have included certain theoretical explana-
tions regarding IPO high underpricing, some deficiencies still exist. These include the
following. 1) In terms of research method, the assumptions in existing theoretical re-
search do not coincide with the current national situation due to differences in Chinese
and foreign issuing systems. Therefore, these theories from foreign scholars fail to fully
explain why China’s IPO high underpricing continues to exist. 2) Foreign scholars ex-
plain IPO high underpricing from the perspective of non-homogenous expectations of
investors, but fail to theoretically explain IPO pricing efficiency under different issuing
mechanisms from the perspective of non-homogenous expectations of investors. 3)
Domestic scholars are mainly engaged in empirical study, and therefore, there is a lack
of normative research. This paper tries to overcome the deficiencies in previous
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literature by establishing the IPO pricing and underpricing models under different issu-
ing mechanisms from the perspective of non-homogenous expectations of investors;
researching the influence of non-homogenous expectations of investors on IPO under-
pricing; conducting a comparative analysis of underpricing; and attempting to theoret-
ically explain the IPO pricing efficiency problem under different issuing mechanisms
according to actual issuing situations of national IPOs. We try to improve on previous
studies in the following ways. First, we establish the IPO pricing and underpricing
models under issuing mechanisms from the perspective of non-homogenous expec-
tations of investors, conduct a comparative analysis of IPO pricing efficiency under
different issuing mechanisms, and theoretically explain the reason why IPO high under-
pricing may exist in a market-oriented pricing mechanism. Second, we adopt a data
analysis method to support the conclusions of this paper and verify the reason why
IPO high underpricing always exists under the bookbuilding mechanism.
Background
In recent decades, the Initial Public Offerings has been the concern of financial re-
searchers in China or abroad, in particular, the mystery of "IPO underpricing" enjoyed
more in-depth study by many scholars. Short-term performance of IPO issue price gen-
erally is lower than the closing price listed on the first day, which has been referred to
as IPO underpricing. Over the past three decades, many scholars carry out a study of
the phenomenon, and put forward a variety of theories and hypothesis, but so far there
is no theory recognized generally. Although China's stock market after more than 20
years of development, but in the IPO market high underpricing phenomenon still ex-
ists, and compared with mature capital markets, IPO underpricing is higher and high
underpricing will sustain for a very long time. China's IPO underpricing anomaly has
attracted a lot of the attention of scholars. Taking into account the unique combination
of China's market environment and institutional background, scholars have put forward
a wide range of theoretical description and speculation, but empirical research litera-
ture has usually only obtained the relevant factors affecting IPO underpricing, not to
explain theoretically the fundamental reason for high IPO underpricing in China.
Methods
Firstly, by studying the impact of heterogeneous expectations on IPO underpricing in
different ways of distribution, we raise heterogeneous expectations hypothesis–Institu-
tional investors and retail investors in the assessment of the value of new shares have
inevitable differences. According to this hypothesis, using behavioral finance theory and
game theory, we establish respectively the pricing and underpricing models under
fixed-price and bookbuilding, and does a comparative study between them. Secondly,
we use Matlab make Numerical analysises.
IPO underpricing models under different issuing mechanisms
Problem description and assumed condition
We assume that the issuing quantity of an offering is 1, the underwriter invites not less
than two institutional investors to participate in the offer, and all the institutional inves-
tors involved in bookbuilding are homogeneous. The issuer regulates the placing ratio
of institutional investors as k during the IPO issuing before bookbuilding, k ∈ (0 , 1), and
the placing amount of institutional investors during IPO issuing is k. Issuer
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determines the issuing price according to the total amount of their placing ratio
after accumulating institutional investors’ demands. Investors in the market can be
divided into two types: institutional investors of the quantity n and retail investors
of the quantity m.
We assume that the issuer and institutional investors are rational enough and their priori
estimate of the IPO intrinsic value is unbiased; it is deemed that the IPO intrinsic value is
V1→N(Ē(U), σ1
2); a priori estimate of the IPO intrinsic value of the retail investor is V2 and
a posteriori estimate of the IPO intrinsic value of investors is V2 ~V1 + ε(Ē(U) + ε, σ1
2),
which is consistent with the conclusion that noise and rational traders can coexist in the
same market in the long term, predicted by the DSSW model (De Long et al.).
Before the IPO subscription, all the investors will receive a private signal about V1.
Furthermore, we assume that the signal structure is εi ~N(0 , σ2
2) and εi and V1 are mu-
tually independent, i = 1 , 2 ,⋯, n +m. Since different investors understand information
differently, differences exist in the realized value of the signal. We assume that the
realized value si of si is private information, however, the signal structure is common
knowledge. To distinguish institutional and retail investors, we use si(i = 1 , 2 ,⋯, n)
and sj(j = 1 , 2 ,⋯,m) to express the private information of institutional and retail inves-
tors. The model is divided into two periods: in zero period, the issuer determines the
IPO issuing price p1 and conducts placement with investors; and in the first period, the
IPO is transacted in the secondary market, the equilibrium market price is p2, and we
assume that the time interval between the issuing and the listing is short enough and
that investors fail to get any new information during this period.
Under different issuing mechanisms, we define underpricing caused using in-
vestor estimates of the offering value as the unintentional underpricing and other
underpricing elements caused by investor risk aversion as intentional underpricing
(Xiaocheng et al. 2008).
Determination of IPO issuing price under the fixed-price issuing mechanism
Under the fixed-price issuing mechanism, since the issuer cannot determine the
effective purchase demand, generally, the issuer will formulate the issuing price in strict
accordance with the principle of expected utility maximization based on the determin-
ation of a risk aversion coefficient. To the greatest extent possible, without any refer-
ence of the IPO pricing, the issuer will formulate the IPO pricing close to its
prospective value to avoid issuing failure risk or deficient IPO financing. As the IPO
true value is unknown during pricing, The risk-averse issuer will maximize his expected
utiliy according to the CARA utility function (He X and Yang C; 2008), The pricing of
the expected utility maximization is listed below:





¼ −EXP −ρp1ð Þ
Hence, IPO issuing price is





The above formula indicates that under the fixed-price issuing mechanism, as the issuer
expects to avoid pricing risk, p1 and Ē(U) IPO prospective value are positively correlated,
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whereas p1 and the risk aversion coefficient are negatively correlated. Therefore, when the
issuer risk is neutral, namely ρ = 0, the IPO issuing price is equal to the Ē(U) IPO pro-
spective value. To avoid issuing failure or attract enough investors to participate in the
IPO subscription, the issuer transfers a part of the risks to investors in the primary mar-
ket, which is similar to the conclusions in Rock’s (1986) “winner’s curse” model.
After issuing, the stock is transacted in the secondary market. We assume that in-
vestors’ optimal demand in the first period depends on the information gained at the
beginning of the first period and the expectation of the IPO clearing price in the sec-
ond period. Consequently, we make Iij, p3(i = 1, 2,⋯, n, j = 1, 2,⋯m), respectively, stand
for information gained by institutional and retail investors at the beginning of the first
period and their expected IPO clearing price. Therefore, the obedience mean value of
p3 based on Iij conditional distribution is E(p3|Iij) and the variance is normal distribu-
tion of D(p3|Iij). According to investors’ expected utility maximization E[U(Wij)] =
EXP{−ρ[(p3 − p2)q1]}, we solve its maximum value and we conclude that investors’ opti-
mal demand in the first period is q1 ¼
E p3jIijð Þ−p2
ρD p3jIijð Þ .
Under the fixed-price issuing mechanism, the issuing price excludes any private
investor information; hence, all investors only have their own private information in
the first period. Based on Kyle’s conclusions in 1989 and the above formula, we can
obtain i institutional investors’ optimal demand at the moment as follows:
qi1 ¼
σ22E Uð Þ þ σ12si− σ22 þ σ12ð Þp2
ρσ12σ22
In a similar way, j retail investors’ optimal demand in the first period is
qj1 ¼
σ22E Uð Þ þ σ12sj þ σ22 þ σ12ð Þ V 2−V 1−p2ð Þ
ρσ12σ22






qj ¼ 1, we can
conclude that the equilibrium market price p2 in the first period is p2 ¼


















σ12 þ σ22 þ V 2−V 1 ¼
EðUÞ þ V 2−V 1: ð2Þ
According to formulas (1) and (2), under the fixed-price issuing mechanisms, the
IPO prospective underpricing is
UP1 ¼ p2−p1p1
¼ ρσ1
2 þ 2 V 2−V 1ð Þ
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 ð3Þ
Based on the above formula (3), under fixed-price issuing, the IPO underpricing can be
divided into ρσ1
2
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 and
2 V 2−V 1ð Þ
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 . According to the abovementioned definition, the
former is led by investor risk aversion, which is intentional underpricing, whereas the latter
is led by investor heterogeneity, which is unintentional underpricing. In addition, IPO
underpricing and V2 −V1 are positively correlated, namely the larger the investor non-
homogenous expectations, the larger the unintentional underpricing and IPO underpricing,
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which indicates that under the fixed-price issuing; the unintentional underpricing caused
by investor non-homogenous expectations is one reason for IPO high underpricing.
Determination of IPO issuing price under the bookbuilding issuing mechanism
Under the bookbuilding mechanism, the issuer first invites institutional investors for ten-
der offers and determines the issuing price according to their offer information and total
amount of placements, and the rest of the shares are placed with retail investors based on
the issuing price. Rational institutional investors generally take the estimate of the IPO in-
trinsic value as the offer basis during the purchase offer. The placement rule for institu-
tional investors’ quantity discrimination can lead to truthful disclosure of private
information during IPO bookbuilding (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989); therefore, this paper
excludes the possibility of investors hiding information. Although in practice, institutional
investors only report limited pair (price and quantity demand) combinations, this paper
assumes that they report continuous demand curves to simplify the analysis.
In zero period, i institutional investors only have private information si of their
own; hence, the posteriori estimate of IPO intrinsic value V is E V jsið Þ ¼ σ2
2E Uð Þþσ12si
σ12þσ22 ,
D V jsið Þ ¼ σ12σ22σ12þσ22, and its optimal demand in zero period is qi ¼
σ22E Uð Þþσ12si− σ12þσ22ð Þp1
ρσ12σ22
.
We assume that k ≤ 1 is the placing ratio for institutional investors, and according to
the equilibrium condition of the primary market
Xn
i¼1
si ¼ k , we can solve the IPO issu-
ing price as follows:
p1 ¼
nσ22E Uð Þ þ σ12
Xn
i¼1si−ρk
n σ12 þ σ22ð Þ ð4Þ
According to (4), we can conclude that under the issuing mechanism of bookbuilding, a
monotone, increasing linear corresponding relation exists between the IPO issuing price
and institutional investor private information
Xn
i¼1si . Therefore, participants may inferXn
i¼1si by virtue of the issuing price, and at the end of the zero period, institutional
investor private information
Xn
i¼1si will become participant common knowledge.
In the first period, since institutional investor private information
Xn
i¼1si will be-
come participant common knowledge, their conditional expectations and the variance













Combined with Kyle's results (1989) and the above formula, Their optimal demand in







In the first period, besides their own private information, retail investors j also master
institutional investors’ private information; hence, their conditional expectations and
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Then, their optimal demand in the first period is
qj ¼




− nþ 1ð Þσ12 þ σ22½  V 2−V 1−p2ð Þ
ρσ12σ22






qj ¼ 1 and m→∞, we obtain the equi-
librium price of the secondary market:
p2 ¼
σ22E Uð Þ þ σ12V−nσ12
Xn
i¼1si
nþ 1ð Þσ12 þ σ22 þ V 2−V 1: ð5Þ




2σ22 þ n σ12 þ σ22ð Þ V 2−V 1ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12 þ σ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 ð6Þ
According to formula (6), the former kρσ1
2σ22
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 is led by investor risk aver-
sion, which is intentional underpricing, whereas the latter n σ1
2þσ22ð Þ V 2−V 1ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 is led by
investor heterogeneity, which is unintentional underpricing. From formula (6), we can
directly reach a conclusion that IPO underpricing and degree of risk aversion as well as
investor heterogeneous estimates of the offering value are positively correlated. Since
IPO underpricing is positively correlated with V2 − V1 under bookbuilding—namely the
larger of the investors’ non-homogenous expectations, the higher of the unintentional
underpricing or IPO underpricing, which indicates that the unintentional underpricing
caused by investor non-homogenous expectations is one of the main cause of the IPO
high-underpricing under bookbuilding.
Comparative analysis of IPO underpricing
The results of the IPO underpricing model under the two types of issuing mechanisms
can be summarized as follows:
According to the above Table 1, we can conclude the following:
Conclusion one: Issuing stock either by fixed price or bookbuilding fails to eliminate
IPO underpricing.
The above Table 1 shows that IPO underpricing exists under both issuing me-
chanisms, and that the IPO underpricing, degree of risk aversion, and retail investor
estimates of the offering value are positively correlated, whereas the IPO underpricing
and the institutional investor estimates of the offering value and the intrinsic value of
the offering are negatively correlated. Under fixed-price issuing, the IPO intentional
underpricing is only related to the issuer’s degree of risk aversion, and the unintentional
underpricing is related to institutional and retail investors’ estimates of the offering
value (non-homogenous expectations). However, under bookbuilding, intentional
underpricing is not only related to institutional investor estimates of the offering value
but also to the placing ratio of the offering and institution quantity, and the unin-
tentional underpricing is related to investor degree of heterogeneity, placing ratio, and
institution quantity. The degree of risk aversion cannot be controlled; therefore, a
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Table 1 Comparison of IPO pricing and underpricing under fixed-price and bookbuilding issuing. The table shows the issuing pricing、Equilibrium price of secondary market、IPO
intentional underpricing and unintentional underpricing under Fixed-price issuing and Bookbuilding issuing. The results come from the IPO underpricing model (3) and model (6). The
table are shown as follows:
Issuing way Issuing price Equilibrium price of secondary market IPO underpricing Intentional underpricing Unintentional underpricing (non-homogenous expectation)















nþ1ð Þσ12þσ22 þ V2−V1
kρσ12σ22þn σ12þσ22ð Þ V2−V1ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22
kρσ12σ22
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22
n σ12þσ22ð Þ V2−V1ð Þ









policy for conclusion one suggests strengthening information disclosure and investor
training, and decreasing irrational investment and investor non-homogenous expecta-
tions to further lower unintentional underpricing and IPO underpricing.
Conclusion two: The larger the investor non-homogenous expectations, the higher
the IPO underpricing. Under the fixed-price issuing mechanism, the IPO underpricing
is σ1
2E Uð Þ
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 þ
2 V 2−V 1ð Þ
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 . The first part is the prospective underpricing led by issuer’s
intentional cut-rate prices to avoid risk, and the second is the unintentional under-
pricing caused by institutional and retail investors’ heterogeneity. This reveals that the
larger the non-homogenous expectations, namely V2 −V1, the higher the IPO under-
pricing. Therefore, under the two different issuing mechanisms, the larger the investors’
non-homogenous expectation, the larger the unintentional and IPO underpricing. Con-
clusion two indicates, under either issuing mechanism, IPO high underpricing is not
only caused by intentional underpricing of the issuer and institution but also by unin-
tentional underpricing from investor heterogeneity. Hence, to reduce IPO high under-
pricing, not only intentional underpricing should be decreased but also heterogeneity
among investors should be eliminated, further lowering unintentional underpricing and
IPO high underpricing. The economic meaning of conclusion two lies in decreasing
information asymmetry by enhancing IPO information disclosure and investor rational
education, and further investor divergence (non-homogenous expectations) on offering
values can be reduced and unintentional underpricing can be lowered as well.
Conclusion three: Under the same condition, compared with fixed-price, IPO
prospective underpricing is much lower under bookbuilding.
Through comparison between formulas (3) and (6), we know that when n ≥ 2, IPO
underpricing under bookbuilding is kρσ1
2σ22
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 þ
n σ12þσ22ð Þ V 2−V 1ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 . After the
numerator and denominator of this formula are simultaneously divided by σ2
2, we obtain
kρσ12











V 2−V 1ð Þ





. Obviously, nE Uð Þ σ12σ22 þ 1
 	
−kρσ12≥2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 .
However, n σ1
2þσ22ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 ≤
2
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 ; hence, UP2 ≤UP1. In the meantime, due
to n σ1
2þσ22ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 ≤
2
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 , unintentional underpricing caused by investors
non-homogenous expectations under bookbuilding is much lower than that under
the fixed-price mechanism, which is consistent with the research results of Benveniste et
al. (2002). The economic meaning of conclusion three lies in strengthening infor-
mation disclosure and supervision of offerings, making more investors participate
in offer pricing and decreasing non-homogenous expectations among investors, in-
formation asymmetry, and IPO unintentional underpricing to further lower IPO
high-underpricing, since bookbuilding and fixed-price issuing offers higher pricing
efficiency. Under bookbuilding, institutional investor intentional underpricing can
be reduced by adding institution quantity and decreasing the placing ratio of the
offering. Hence, more institutions will participate in the IPO subscription through
the enhancing training force of the institution; thus, the IPO intentional under-
pricing can be reduced and further IPO high-underpricing can be prevented in two
ways.
Conclusion four: Under bookbuilding, if investor non-homogenous expectations
become larger, IPO underpricing may be much higher than that under fixed-price issuing.
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Based on the above analysis, we know that under the same conditions, IPO under-
pricing using bookbuilding may be lower than that using the fixed-price method. How-
ever, under bookbuilding, when V2 −V1 is larger than V2 −V1 under the fixed-price
method, though n σ1
2þσ22ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 ≤
2
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12,
n σ12þσ22ð Þ V 2−V 1ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 may be larger than
2 V 2−V 1ð Þ
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 , which is to say that unintentional underpricing caused by investor non-
homogenous expectations changes. When n σ1
2þσ22ð Þ V 2−V 1ð Þ
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 is larger than
ρσ12þ2 V 2−V 1ð Þ
2E Uð Þ−ρσ12 þ
kρσ12σ22
nE Uð Þ σ12þσ22ð Þ−kρσ12σ22 , IPO underpricing under bookbuilding is surely lar-
ger than that under fixed-price. The economic meaning of conclusion four lies in the
fact that the market-oriented bookbuilding mechanism does not always reduce IPO
underpricing when investor non-homogenous expectations are different under the
different issuing mechanisms. Therefore, when bookbuilding is adopted in China,
only by strengthening investor rational education, decreasing non-homogenous
expectations between institutional and retail investors and IPO information asym-
metry, and enhancing supervision can real marketization of the bookbuilding
mechanism be realized, thus further lowering IPO underpricing and improving IPO
pricing efficiency.
Numerical analysis
To discuss IPO pricing efficiency under different pricing mechanisms and provide
numerical support for our results, we look at an example of a company IPO and apply
the underpricing model to conduct a numerical and comparative analysis of the fixed-
price and bookbuilding to gain a better understanding of management during the IPO
process. Matlab software is used to do the numerical simulation as follows:
1) Under the same condition of investor non-homogenous expectations, the risk
aversion coefficient’s influence on IPO underpricing under the different issuing
mechanisms.
We make n = 10, k = 0.65 ρ = 2, σ1
2 = 1, σ2
2 = 2.5, Ē(U) = 12.6,V2 = 14.5,V1 = 11.46,
adopt the abovementioned parameters, and use Matlab to plot and discuss the
relation between IPO underpricing and ρ. ρ∈ [0, 4], σ2∈ [0, 4]. The figures are
shown as follows:
In Fig. 1, UP1 is IPO underpricing under the fixed-price mechanism and UP2
is IPO underpricing under bookbuilding. The results show that under the two
different pricing mechanisms, IPO underpricing and ρ and σ1
2 are positively
correlated, and both are larger than zero, namely the larger the issuer and
institutional investor aversion risk, the higher the IPO underpricing. However,
under the same conditions, compared with the fixed-price mechanism, the IPO
underpricing under bookbuilding is much lower, which illustrates that under the
same conditions, bookbuilding offers much higher pricing efficiency than the
fixed-price method, and further corroborates conclusions one and three.
2) Investor non-homogenous expectations’ influence on IPO underpricing under
different issuing mechanisms.
We adopt the abovementioned parameters to discuss the relation between IPO
underpricing and investor non-homogenous expectations, and use Matlab to plot
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the relation between IPO underpricing and V1,V2. V1∈ [8, 16] ,V2∈ [8, 16]. The
figures are shown as follows:
Figure 2 shows that IPO underpricing and V2 are positively correlated, and that
IPO underpricing and V1 are negatively correlated. In other words, the more
optimistic retail investor attitude is toward the IPO prospect, the higher the
unintentional underpricing, which confirms conclusion two above. When V2 = 8,
V1 = 16, and V2 −V1 is smaller, although non-homogenous expectations among
investors are larger, unintentional underpricing is negative, and although
intentional underpricing is positive, it fails to eliminate the influence of investor
non-homogenous expectations on IPO underpricing. Through comparisons of the
graphs in Fig. 2, under the same conditions, IPO underpricing is within −0.25 and
0.9 under fixed-price issuing, whereas IPO underpricing is within −0.75 and 0.45
under bookbuilding; compared with fixed price, IPO underpricing is much lower
under bookbuilding, which explains why, under the same conditions,
bookbuilding offers much higher pricing efficiency than fixed price, and further
demonstrates conclusions one and three. The above figures show that under the
same circumstances, when investor non-homogenous expectations are larger under
bookbuilding than under fixed price, IPO underpricing under bookbuilding may be
equal to or higher than that under fixed price. This illustrates that bookbuilding
does not always reduce IPO underpricing and further demonstrates conclusion four.
3) Different investor non-homogenous expectations’ influence on IPO underpricing
under different issuing mechanisms.
To further demonstrate conclusion four, we adopt the above parameters to discuss
different investor non-homogenous expectations’ influence on IPO underpricing
under the different issuing mechanisms. We assume investor estimates of offering
value under bookbuilding as V2 = 16.5,V1 = 11.46 and investor estimates of offering
value under fixed price as V2 = 14.5,V1 = 11.46; thus, investor non-homogenous
expectations under bookbuilding are larger (16.5-11.46=5.01) than those under
Fig. 1 Risk aversion coefficient’s influence on IPO underpricing comparing the two pricing mechanisms. We
look at an example of a company IPO to analysis the risk and risk aversion coefficient’s influence on IPO
underpricing under the different issuing mechanisms Under the same condition of investor heterogeneous
expectations. The main data: n = 10, k = 0.65 , σ2
2 = 2.5, Ē(U) = 12.6, V2 = 14.5, V1 = 11.46. We used Matlab to
plot the relation between IPO underpricing and risk and risk aversion coefficient under different issuing
mechanisms. According to the model (3) and model (6) in the paper. ρ ∈ [0, 4], σ2 ∈ [0, 4]. UP1 is IPO
underpricing under the fixed-price mechanism and UP2 is IPO underpricing under bookbuilding
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fixed price (14.5-11.46=3.01). We then use Matlab to plot and discuss the relation
between IPO underpricing and ρ and σ1
2. ρ∈ [0, 4], σ2∈ [0, 4]. The figures are
shown as follows:
In Fig. 3, UP1 is IPO underpricing under fixed-price and UP2 is IPO
underpricing under bookbuilding. Based on Fig. 3, we know that when
ρ ≤ 3 or σ1
2 ≤ 2, IPO underpricing under bookbuilding is larger than that under
fixed-price, which explains why IPO underpricing under bookbuilding may also
be much higher than that under fixed price when investor non-homogenous
expectations under bookbuilding are larger than those under fixed price, and
further illustrates conclusion four.
Results and discussion
Results: Through the above study, we got the following results:
1) Issuing stock either by fixed price or bookbuilding fails to eliminate IPO underpricing.
2) The larger the investor non-homogenous expectations, the higher the IPO
underpricing.
3) Under the same condition, compared with fixed-price, IPO prospective underpricing
is much lower under bookbuilding.
4) Under bookbuilding, if investor non-homogenous expectations become larger, IPO
underpricing may be much higher than that under fixed-price issuing.
Discussion: IPO equilibrium pricing and underpricing models in this paper are obtained
based on assumptions of the issuer and institutional investor’s risk aversion and the het-
erogeneity of institutional and retail investors. In case these assumptions are removed, es-
pecially the heterogeneity of all the investors, it will be extremely difficult to solve the
Fig. 2 Relation between IPO underpricing and V1, V2 under different issuing mechanism. We use the data
V1 ∈ [8, 16], V2 ∈ [8, 16], n = 10, k = 0.65 ρ = 2, σ12 = 1, σ22 = 2.5, discuss the relation between IPO underpricing
and investors’ heterogeneous expectations, and use Matlab to plot the relation between IPO underpricing
and V1, V2. According to the model (3) and model (6) in the paper. UP1 is IPO underpricing under the
fixed-price mechanism and UP2 is IPO underpricing under bookbuilding
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analytical expression of the optimized quotation under different circumstances. This is a
limitation of this paper as well as a problem worthy of further investigation.
Conclusions
Through the comparative study of IPO underpricing under different issuing mecha-
nisms, we reach the following conclusions. Issuing stock using either the fixed price or
bookbuilding cannot eliminate IPO underpricing. Under both mechanisms, the larger
the investor non-homogenous expectations, the larger the IPO underpricing. Compared
with the fixed price, unintentional underpricing caused by non-homogenous expecta-
tions under bookbuilding and IPO underpricing are much lower. In the case when
investor non-homogenous expectations are much larger, compared with fixed price,
IPO underpricing under bookbuilding may be much higher than that under fixed price.
Finally, through the numerical analysis, this paper obtains a better management under-
standing and provides quantitative support for its conclusions. Different from previous
research conclusions, this paper not only theoretically explains the reasons why the
issuing mechanism of bookbuilding offers a much higher IPO pricing coefficient
than that of fixed price but also explains why the bookbuilding mechanism does
not always reduce IPO underpricing from the perspective of investor non-homogenous
expectations.
The issuing mechanism of bookbuilding offers a much higher IPO pricing coefficient
than that of fixed-price on the condition that non-homogenous expectations among
investors remain unchanged. Once non-homogenous expectations among investors
increase, this may cause the IPO underpricing under bookbuilding to become even
higher. Hence, when the issuing mechanism of bookbuilding is adopted in China,
only by decreasing non-homogenous expectations among institutional investors can
real marketization of bookbuilding be given full play, further lowering IPO high-
underpricing.
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under the fixed-price mechanism and UP2 is IPO underpricing under bookbuilding
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